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In systems composed of multiple autonomous agents, negotiation is a key form of interaction that
enables groups of agents to arrive at a mutual agreement regarding some belief, goal or plan, for
example. Particularly because the agents are autonomous and cannot be assumed to be benevolent,
agents must inﬂuence others to convince them to act in certain ways, and negotiation is thus critical
for managing such inter-agent dependencies. The process of negotiation may be of many different
forms, such as auctions, protocols in the style of the contract net, and argumentation, but it is unclear
just how sophisticated the agents or the protocols for interaction must be for successful negotiation in
different contexts. All these issues were raised in the panel session on negotiation.
As a prelude to the discussion, Jennings identiﬁed three broad topics for research on negotiation,
that serve to organise the issues under consideration. First, negotiation protocols are the set of rules
that govern the interaction. This covers, the permissible types of participants (e.g., the negotiators and
relevant third parties), the negotiation states (e.g., accepting bids, negotiation closed), the events that
cause state transitions (e.g., no more bidders, bid accepted), and the valid actions of the participants
in particular states (e.g., which can be sent by whom, to whom and at when). Second, negotiation
objects are the range of issues over which agreement must be reached. These may single issues, such
as price, or multiple issues relating to price, quality, timing, etc. Also relevant here are the allowable
operations on these objects. In the simplest case, the structure and contents of the agreement are ﬁxed,
and negotiation amounts to accepting or rejecting the offer. The next level, however, offers ﬂexibility
to change the values of the issues in the negotiation object, through counter-proposals, changing the
structure of the negotiation object (by adding guarantees, for example), and so on. Finally, the agents’
reasoning models provide the decision making apparatus by which participants attempt to achieve
their objectives. The sophistication of the model is determined by the protocol used, the nature of the
negotiation object, and the range of operations that can be performed on it.
The range of problems and issues in this area is clearly wide, yet they can be considered as fun-
damental to many forms of interaction. To focus discussion, the panelists were asked seven questions
that were felt to be key to negotiation. Each of the questions are presented below along with a sum-
mary of the responses of the panelists.
Argumentation and negotiation in multi-agent systems can involve sophisticated, high-
level reasoning. How relevant to such processes are the lower-level communication lan-
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1guages that underpin them? In what way do they constrain the kinds of processes possible
to implement with them?
In order to build practical applications, the low-level underpinning infrastructure is clearly very
important. For example, any formally-based argumentation/negotiation protocol must deal with the
loss of messages or one of the partners of the interaction being down. While the former can be as-
sumed to be handled by a reliable communication protocol (such as TCP/IP), or a standard distributed
computing platform (such as CORBA), the latter must be part of the argumentation/negotiation pro-
tocol.
Indeed, lower-level communication languages control the conversation classes in which pairs of
agents can participate. The conversational components are deﬁned not only by the action speciﬁed,
but also by the pre-conditions, post-conditions and completion-conditions of that performative. These
deﬁne the circumstances under which the communication can take place, and include the belief state
of the respective agents. To be able to negotiate effectively, the agents must have some beliefs about
what the world will be like in the future, rather than an implicit belief in the ’truth’ (at least as far as
the responding agent is concerned) of a conventional ask-tell conversational class.
For a negotiation to be completed successfully all parties (i.e. agents) must clearly understand the
rules of engagement or negotiation protocol. For example, in a simple contract-net protocol, in which
a manager issues a call for proposals and waits for a full set of replies (or timeouts), each bidder
must be prepared to honour its bid for the duration of the bid’s validity. Otherwise, acceptance of
the bid will require a second negotiation, which may itself succeed or fail. If an agent is no longer
able to honour its bid, the other agents that originally bid may well have already have accepted other
commitments and no longer be in a position to accept that commitment. The whole bidding process
might then have to be restarted.
It is clear that the design of a communications language can restrict or enable different forms
of high level reasoning among the agents involved in negotiation. For example, KQML (Labrou
and Finin, 1997) places unnecessary restrictions on an agent community - an agent sending a query
is expected to decide how the recipient will handle it, rather than the recipient (and possibly other
members of the community) making that decision. The sender must decide whether the recipient will
respond directly, broker the query, recommend an agent to send the query to, or recruit an agent who
will send the response directly to the original agent. Based on this decision, the agent must choose an
appropriate KQML performative to send. However, in everyday negotiation, if one is asked “Can you
ﬁx this bug?”, it is more likely to be you who decides how to involve others. You might reply, “No,
but Julie knows about that sort of thing. Ask her.”, or you might say yes, but subcontract it to Julie
without involving me. Hence the decision of whether to act as a broker, a recommender, or to respond
directly is left to the recipient of the request, not the requester. In KQML, this is not possible.
The contract net is described as negotiation though it is simply a very straightforward
protocol: task announcement, make bid, award contract etc. Does this count as nego-
tiation? If not, what *does* constitute negotiation in terms both of the participating
autonomous agents and the nature of the communication itself?
If negotiation is deﬁned as any communicative process that results in mutually acceptable agree-
ment then clearly the contract net protocol does constitute negotiation albeit in a rather simple form.
Similarly, the sealed-price second bid auction is a means of negotiation, which involves even less
communication than the contract net. One of the tasks of a protocol designer is to create a protocol
that accomplishes the desired result with the minimum amount of communication. Simplicity is best.
2Negotiation in a multi-agent systems context will always be speciﬁed by a protocol — be it simple
or sophisticated, deterministic or non-deterministic — and thus will not be different in its nature from
the contract net protocol. In fact, even the Encyclopedia Britannica deﬁnes negotiation quite generally
as, “the action or process of negotiating or being negotiated.” This deﬁnition looks a little like a
circular argument, but there is more in the deﬁnition of negotiate as, “to carry on business,
￿
￿
￿,t o
confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter
￿
￿
￿.”
These deﬁnitions easily cover such protocols as the contract net and other “simple” protocols.
Can all aspects of negotiation be incorporated into predeﬁned communication protocols?
Most members of the panel suggested that this is not possible and that it is the agent’s reasoning
model that is the key to successful negotiation. Preist offers as an example a second hand electronic
components market, in which an important consideration is whether one agent trusts the other to
deliver when he says he will. Trust is established partly as a result of the way in which the negotiation
is carried out. It is unlikely that this could be represented in protocols.
Beer, however, takes a slightly different position in arguing that the use of special purpose negoti-
ation performatives allow different belief states in the future to be clearly identiﬁed, thus avoiding the
possibility of confusion that might arise with simple ask-tell performatives. He argues that it is the
conversation class that deﬁnes the reason for the communication, not the performatives used.
Are agent communication languages merely stock workhorses with the majority of current
examples (ACL, KQML, etc) roughly equivalent? Does it matter which is chosen for a
particular application or problem area?
Since communication languages can restrict what is possible in different ways, clearly the choice
of language may make a difference in some cases. However, ACL and KQML are roughly the same
and, for many applications, they are ﬁne, as KQML already proved. Interestingly, the KQML speciﬁ-
cation (Finin et al., 1993) uses implicit and explicit negation. For example, KQML deﬁnes the speech
act
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￿. Unfortunately, KQMLuses this distinction only implicitly and, consequently,
many speech acts may be mis-used by practitioners leading to problems when agents inter-operate.
According to Schroeder, while KQML has already been around for a while and has been tested in
many applications, FIPA ACL 1 is relatively new and error-prone. Wagner points out several short-
comings of FIPA ACL (Wagner, 1997). For example, is the distinction between
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only relevant for an external observer; for an agent’s subjective view they are equivalent. Also, an
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Although these points may seem minor, Schroeder argues that they will prevent the use of ACL
for large-scale, open multi-agent systems. At the moment, ACL is used only in small or medium-
sized applications so that problems are not apparent. Once different ACL implementations become
available, ACL may cause inter-operability problems and will need to be revised. Another far more
important point is that KQML and ACL are too academic for many applications. When TMN agents
communicate, they use their simple vocabulary to set and get variable values. When human or arti-
ﬁcial agents negotiate in auctions they do not necessarily require speech acts and logic to carry out
sophisticated transactions. In fact, most of them don’t use them at all.
1http://www.fipa.org/
3Can we ever envisage a standard set of negotiation protocols which all autonomous
agents can adhere to, or will negotiation protocols have to be designed afresh for dif-
ferent applications?
What role do standards have here? Similarly, is it likely that there will be a single uni-
versal standard for inter-agent communication on which to base negotiation, or is that
an unattainable ideal?
Standard negotiation protocols such as on-line auctions already exist, and more are being devel-
oped all the time. In principle, it should be possible to develop some kind of uniform protocol theory,
which embodies all kinds of protocols — ranging from auctions to protocols for co-operation to coali-
tion formation. However, to expect every agent (irrespective of domain) to be able to conform to
any of these protocols would result in seriously heavyweight agents. Fortunately, though, it does not
necessarily follow that every application will need a different protocol. There are many different tasks
requiring coalition formation, and Preist expects that a (possibly small) set of such protocols would
apply to most of them, just as a small set of auction protocols satisﬁes most applications involving
one-to-many negotiation over a commodity.
Beer argues that the mechanisms by which negotiation can be undertaken are fairly clearly deﬁned
(for example by FIPA). It is the negotiation currency that is very much application dependent. Most
work reported is based on monetary values of some form, but we can easily conceive of situations
where speed of response or some measure of ‘closeness’ would be more appropriate.
Schroeder puts forward the alternative view that it is unlikely that any such standard will emerge
for two reasons. First, the applications involving argumentation/negotiation are very different in their
nature ranging from transactions in auctions to argumentation in the philosophical sense. Second, if
argumentation/negotiation is of importance to the participants, they will want to use the best protocol
available making a standard solution unlikely.
Clearly, it is still a matter of much debate as to whether there will ever be a set of inter-agent
negotiation protocols that all agents will adhere to.
What sorts of capabilities are required of agents in order to engage in effective argu-
mentation and negotiation? With a view to implementing argumentation and negotiation,
what particular characteristics might be desired of such lower-level infrastructure?
In responding to this question, Schroeder illuminated the discussion by referring to an historical
example. The ﬁrst scientist who linked argumentation as a discipline in philosophy to mathematics
was Leibniz. His aim was the deﬁnition of an automatic calculus for discourse (Herring, 1992). His
ideas and solutions can teach us a lot about the pitfalls of arguing agents. Leibniz’s motivation for a
calculus of reasoning was nothing less than world peace and the ability to settle questions such as the
existence of god. Leibniz believed that arguments derived from his “calculus raciocinator” had to be
accepted by everybody due to their formal nature. His idea for the calculus was simple and brilliant.
He mapped basic concepts to prime numbers and complex numbers to non-primes such that the basic
concepts deﬁning the complex concepts are the prime factors of the non-prime. As an example he
assigns the primes
￿ and
￿ to the basic concepts “animal” and “rational”, respectively and derives that
the complex concept “human” is therefore
￿
￿
￿, i.e.
￿. Then he concludes that a “monkey” with
number
￿
￿ is not a “human” because neither can we divide
￿
￿ by
￿ nor vice versa. We can deduce,
however, that both have got the concept “animal”, i.e. the factor
￿, in common.
This idea is quite nice and was revolutionary at its time, because it treated human reasoning math-
ematically for the ﬁrst time. But was it useful? Leibniz wants to show this by “assuming all these won-
derful numbers as given”. And this is the problem of Leibniz’s calculus and the arguing/negotiating
4agents we are currently implementing: the developed algorithms and protocols are only useful if they
are ﬁlled with “life”. Leibniz failed to do so, and so may we. The most crucial part in any practi-
cal argumentation/negotiation is not the formal deﬁnition of algorithms and protocols but the ability
to understand an argument. Even with projects like CYC and a lot of work on ontologies, we are
nowhere near this. And, as long as computers cannot understand, simple argumentation/negotiating
protocols will be the most effective tools.
This should not put us off researching more complex issues, but we should be aware of the lim-
its. When implementing such systems, one soon realises that quite a sophisticated infrastructure is
needed. Many applications will require non-monotonic reasoning and two kinds of negation — ex-
plicit negation by which there is an explicit proof in support of the negation of a, and implicit negation
which expresses the absence of evidence for a. This latter form can be used to express things like the
reasonable doubt standard where the absence of evidence for someone’s guilt leads to the conclusion
that they are not guilty.
Given such an expressive knowledge representation, we may need agents with different credibil-
ity. When arguing about the credit-worthiness of a client, the agent taking the ﬁnal decision should be
sceptical; when distributing work to other agents, the distributor should be credulous rather than argu-
ing with helpers who stepped forward to do the job. Technically, the deﬁnition of such agents requires
a ﬂexible deﬁnition of an acceptable argument. When dealing with undercuts and rebuts, a skepti-
cal agent allows counter-arguments of both types whereas a credulous agent admits only undercuts
(Schroeder, 1999).
Jennings addressed the question of which capabilities are required for effective negotiation and
argumentation with a ﬁrm and brief enumeration of the minimal requirements for negotiation and ar-
gumentation. Agents must be able to make proposals, counter-proposals, accept and reject proposals,
and generate arguments in support of their adopted stance on some subject.
Preist extended this with some points relating speciﬁcally to competitive negotiation. First, all
parties should be clear about the belief sets of each of the agents involved in the negotiation process.
At the very least a shared ontology of the domain being negotiated over, or a way of establishing one,
needs to exist. Then, they must be able to make contact with potential negotiators and recognise the
type of ‘game’ in progress. Questions such as the number of negotiators, the number of potential
trading partners, and the market power of individuals, for example, need to be considered and an
appropriate strategy based on this information selected. During the negotiation, agents require both
a means to evaluate the relative value to the agent of different offers made during negotiation and a
means to evaluate the relative value to other agents of offers the agent may potentially make. Finally,
in some situations, the ability to exchange constraints on acceptable offers and to reason with these
constraints may make negotiation more efﬁcient.
How is argumentation related to negotiation?
Jennings suggested that while proposals, counter-proposals and the ability to accept and reject
proposals are minimal requirements of negotiation, they are inadequate if agents seek to justify their
stance or to persuade others to change their negotiation stance. If there are compelling reasons for
adopting a particular position, agents may use arguments to try to change their opponents view, and to
make their own proposal more attractive by providing additional meta-level information in its support.
The nature and types of arguments are varied, but include threats, rewards, appeals, and so on. Thus,
argumentation is a type of negotiation that includes meta-level exchanges to support a negotiator’s
position.
Preist countered that argumentation is an approach to deﬁning the semantics of negotiation, but
that there are other ways of doing so, and that argumentation can also be used to deﬁne semantics of
5other systems. Similarly, Schroeder believes that while argumentation may be useful for negotiation
it is not clear that argumentation is necessary for negotiation at all. Argumentation and negotiation
are disciplines of their own, and have been developed independent of any restrictions imposed by a
computer science concept. Ultimately, however, it can be argued that value arises from application
and, while core aspects of argumentation and negotiation may be distinct, using argumentation as
a means of attaining success through effective negotiation offers a particular kind of vision for this
particular line of research.
What is clear from the panel discussion is that the issues surrounding negotiation offer many
avenues to explore in agent research, covering a range of varied aspects including some of those
touched on above, such as communication languages, protocols, standards, strategies, and models of
reasoning. Despite the centrality (or perhaps even because of the centrality) of negotiation to multi-
agent interaction, much work remains to be done here. Indeed, as the applications arena continues to
broaden, withthe ﬁeldsofweb-based systems and electronic commerce, forexample, surging forward,
the need for effective mechanisms for agent interaction in these areas suggests that the importance of
negotiation will remain high on the agenda of researchers both in this ﬁeld and others.
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